NOTES by unknown
Notes
FEDERAL REVIEW OF STATE PROCEDURE - TE LITIGATION IN
AMRICANm SuRETr COrMANY V. BALDW=N
IN American Surety Company v. Baldwin1 an apparently just cause was de-
feated by a series of procedural technicalities. The Singer Sewing Machine
Company had appealed jointly with Anderson, an employee, from the decision
of an Idaho district court holding both liable to Baldwin for Anderson's negli-
gence; and in order to stay execution pending the appeal it had procured from
the American Surety Company of New York a supersedeas bond, whereby the
surety consented to entry of judgment against it without notice if the decision
were affirmed and the damages were not paid within thirty days. - The Supreme
Court of Idaho affirmed only as to Andqrson, and reversed as to the Singer
Sewing Machine Company,3 but a month later counsel for Baldwin, who had
probably joined the indigent employee in a $19,500 suit only to prevent removal
to the federal courts, obtained from the state district court an cx-parte judg-
ment against the Surety Company, despite the fact that Anderson's name
nowhere appeared in the bond.4 As soon as informed of the decree, though after
the trial term, the Surety Company moved to vacate, claiming that the judgment
was void for lack of notice or opportunity to be heard on the construction of
the bond, and the district court granted the motion. On appeal, however, the
Supreme Court of Idaho reversed,0 holding that the Surety Company had
consented to become a party to the entire action in all its parts,0 and therefore
1. 53 Sup. Ct. 98 (1932).
2. In Idaho every appellant must file a cost bond, but if a party wishe3
execution to be stayed, he must also procure a supersedeas bond binding the
surety in double the amount of the judgment, and providing that "if the
judgment or order appealed from, or any part thereof be affirmed" and the
appellant fail to pay the stipulated damages within thirty days, "judgment
may be entered, on motion of the respondent in his favor against the sureties.'
IDAHo Coimzp. STAT. (1919) §§ 7154, 7155, interpreted in Empire State-Idaho
Mining Co. v. Hanly, 136 Fed. 99 (C. C. A. 9th, 1905); U. S. Fidelity and
Guaranty Co. v. Fort Misery Highway Dist., 22 F. (2d) 309 (C. C. A. 0th,
1927).
3. Baldwin v. Singer Sewing Machine Co. and Anderson, 49 Idaho 231, 287
Pac. 944 (1930). The ground for reversal as to the company was that at the
time of the accident Anderson was not acting within the scope of his employment.
4. The bond is quote'd in full in American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, supra note
1, at note 1.
5. Baldwin v. Anderson and American Surety Co., 50 Idaho 600, 299 Pac.
341 (1931). Judge Budge dissented.
6. It should be noted that the prevailing view is that in an action on a
supersedeas bond, whatever defenses the principal might set up as a bar to
judgment are also available to the surety, and that unless a plaintiff has a
right to demand payment from the principal, the surety is discharged. First
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the district court had originally had jurisdiction to consider whether or not
judgment should be entered on the bond. Consequently the alleged error could
not be considered on motion to vacate, but only on direct appeal.7 Thereupon
the Surety Company made four attempts in the state courts and three in the
federal courts to obtain a hearing on the case.
It sought a reargument before the Supreme Court of Idaho, claiming that
the entry of judgment without notice was in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, but the petition was denied without opinion; 8 it attempted to appeal
from the original judgment of the district court, but was barred because the
statutory period for appeal had elapsed,; 9 and it moved in the district court
to amend the original decree and to vacate the same when so amended, but
the district court refused and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the
corrections sought were questionable and that the previous decision on the
main issue was "the law of the case." 10 Without waiting for these latter
decisions," the Surety Company instituted suit in the federal district court
National Bank of Hastings v. Rogers, 13 Minn. 407 (1868); (see Jackson v.
Barrett, 12 Idaho 465, 469, 86 Pac. 270, 272 (1916). Moreover, Baldwin could
have levied execution against Anderson at any time after the verdict in the
trial court, for a supersedeas does not stay execution against appellants not
mentioned in the bond. IDAHo COMP. STAT. (1919), § 6902 (amended, Sess.
Laws, 1929, p. 70); Ex parte French, 100 U. S. 1 (1879).
7. Bunnell and Eno Co. v. Curtis, 5 Idaho 652, 51 Pac. 767 (1897). But
cf. Gile v. Wood, 32 Idaho 752, 188 Pac. 36 (1920) ; Miller v. Prout, 33 Idaho
709, 197 Pac. 1023 (1921). Ordinarily, an appeal is not allowed from an ex parto
judgment on a bond, for the judgment is said to have been entered by consent
of the surety. People v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 114 Cal. App. 563, 300 Pac. 46
(1931). Counsel for the Surety Company, therefore, had good reason to choose
to move to vacate rather than to appeal. Of course, in the instant case there
was sufficient reason for making an exception to this rule. But the appeal
would have been of no benefit if Baldwin had neglected to inform the Surety
Company of the judgment until after the statutory period for appeal had
elapsed.
8. Baldwin v. Anderson and American Surety Co., supra note 5, at 617, 299
Pac. at 341.
9. Baldwin v. Anderson and American Surety Co., 51 Idaho 614, 8 P. (2d)
461 (1932). The statutory period for appeal in Idaho is ninety days. IDAUO
CoMP. STAT. (1919) § 7152. The court held that the order vacating the original
decree was absolutely void and therefore did not toll the running of the statute.
Judge Budge again dissented. It is interesting to note that the majority rolied
in this opinion on Wright v. Atwood, 33 Idaho 455, 195 Pac. 625 (1921), a case
which seems equallk good authority for the proposition that the district court's
original decree was void and subject to attack on motion to vacate for lack of
jurisdiction. See particularly at 461, 195 Pac. at 627.
10. Baldwin v. Anderson, 13 P. (2d) 650 (1932). Judges Leeper and Budge
dissented on the ground that the court should have taken the opportunity to
prevent an obvious miscarriage of justice despite the tenuous basis for the
current appeal.
11. One reason was probably that subsequent to the taking of the appeal, it
had been decided in another case that a motion to vacate, mistakenly granted,
does not toll the statutory period for appeal. Mt. States Implement Co. V.
Arave, 2 P. (2d) 314 (1931).
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to enjoin Baldwin from levying execution, upon the ground that the judgment
had been entered without notice or consent, contrary to due process of law; but
the federal district judge replied that since an adequate remedy at law existed
in the state courts and since appeals were pending there, the federal courts
were precluded from acting in equity.12 When appeal was taken to the Circuit
Court of Appeals, however, its efforts were momentarily rewarded by a
favorable decision on the merits.13 The court held that, since the Surety
Company had consented to judgment without notice only in the event that
the Singer Sewing Machine Company lost its appeal and failed to pay, the
judgment of the state district court was in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The conflict with the Supreme Court of Idaho was recognized, but the
point in issue was not considered res ad~juicata for it was said that the latter
court, by refusing to analyze the terms of the bond, merely assumed, without
deciding, that the Surety Company had had its day in court.
Meanwhile, the Surety Company had petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for certiorari to review the decision of the Idaho court on the motion
to vacate. This petition was granted together with Baldwin's later petition
for certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals,14 and the cases were argued
and determined together, Mr. Justice Brandeis delivering the opinion for a
unanimous court.13 The certiorari to the Supreme Court of Idaho was dismissed
because the federal question had not been raised until petition for rehearing.'0
On the certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals it was conceded that the
federal courts may enjoin execution of a state court's judgment for lack of
jurisdiction despite the existence of an adequate remedy in the state courts.17
But in the case at bar, it was said, the jurisdictional issue had become Tea
adjudicata by reason of the decision of the Supreme Court of Idaho.'B That
12. American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 51 F. (2d) 596 (D. Idaho 1931). Where
the question is one of jurisdiction, it is not true that an adequate remedy at
law in the state courts bars the federal courts from acting in equity. Franklin
v. Nevada-California Power Co., 264 Fed. 643 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920); Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wells, 265 U. S. 101 (1924). Nor does the
pendency of identical appeals in a state court preclude federal jurisdiction.
Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548 (1876); Borden's Condensed Milk Co. v. Baker,
177 Fed. 906 (C. C. A. 3d, 1910).
13. American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 55 F. (2d) 555 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932).
The authority mainly relied on was National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U. S.
257 (1904). Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877); Cooper v. Newell, 173
U. S. 555 (1899).
14. 286 U. S. 536, 537 (1932).
15. American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, supra note 1.
16. Live Oak Water Users Ass'n v. Railroad Commission, 269 U. S. 354
(1926). But cf. Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U. S. 317 (1917); Brinkerhoff-Faris
Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673 (1930) (both distinguished by the Court). Even though
the federal question had not been raised until the rehearing, if the state court
had at that time expressed an opinion thereon, the Supreme Court would not
have declined to consider it. Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 589 (1901).
17. See cases cited supra, notes 12 and 13.
18. Mitehell v. First National Bank, 180 U. S. 471 (1901). That the prin-
ciples of res adjudicata may apply to questions of procedure as well as to




court clearly had jurisdiction of the entire case after the motion to vacate and
the appeal thereon,19 and in order for it to hold the motion to vacate improper,
the original jurisdiction of the trial court had to be affirmatively determined.20
No matter how unsound the state court's decision, therefore, the issue could
not again be raised in the federal courts.
But the Surety Company contended further that even if the jurisdiction of
the trial court over the parties were granted, the federal courts could enjoin
execution of the judgment on the ground that it had not been given an oppor
tunity to be heard on the construction of the bond, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This contention was denied because the state procedure afforded
ample opportunity to be heard on appeal. "Due process requires that there be
an opportunity to present every available defence; but it need not be before
entry of judgment." 21 Moreover, the Court added, the circumstance that such
opportunity was lost because misapprehension as to the appropriate remedy
was not removed by judicial decision until it was too late to rectify the error,
does not permit a party to prosecute his case "piecemeal in State and Federal
courts." 22
It is, of course, unlikely that a precisely similar case will ever arise. Never-
theless, this decision is clear authority for the proposition that the federal courts
may not relieve a patty from the entanglements of a state's procedure once
the state has properly acquired jurisdiction. Thus, after the entry of judgment
against it, the sole ground upon which the Surety Company could have invoked
the equity powers of the lower federal courtA would have been that the state
district court lacked jurisdiction, and then only if no decision on the question
had previously been rendered by the courts of the state. As for the dortieorai
to the Supreme Court of Idaho, it would seem that even if the contention that,
granting jurisdiction, the Surety Company had been given no opportunity to
be heard on the construction of the bond, had been seasonably raised and
determined by the state court as a federal question, the United Statem Supreme
Court would have dismissed the claim because compliance with the procedure
outlined by the state supreme court would have afforded adequate opportunity
to be heard. If, however, the Surety Company had contested the very jurig-
dictioii of the trial cotft as a denial of its rights under the Fourteenth Amenaed-
tiaeit it i§ doubtful thdt the United States Supreme Court would have denied
itsei power id review the state court's deeision, even If the guprome court of
the state had adjudicated the issue.23
19. Cf. Baldwin v. Iowa State Travelling Men's Ass'n, supra note 18.
20. This reasoning alone might have constituted the issue, by implication,
res adjudicata. Cf. Napa Valley Electric Co. v. Railro'ad Commission, 261
U. S. 366 (1920); Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission, 281 U. S. 470 (1930).
But, according to Mr. Justice Brandeis, the opinion in the state court displayed,
besides, a direct holding that the trial court possessed the necessary jurisdiction.
21. Cf. York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15- (1890); Bianchi v. Morales, 262 U. S.
170 (1923).
22. Cf. O'Neil v, Northern Colorado Irrigation Co, 242 U, S. 20 (1916),
and cases cited in American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, supre, note 1, at note
no. 6.
23. McDonald v. Mabie, 243 U. S. 90 (1917); cf. Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v.
Hill, 281 U. S. 673 (1930); Postal Telegraph Co. v. Newport, 247 U. S. 404
(1918). See also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S, 714 (1877).
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STATUS OF THE STANDARD FORM COTRACT iN THE XOTION PicTuRE INDu sTY
THE first effective attack on the validity of the Standard Exhibition Contract
in the motion picture industry was made by the Government in 1929.1 The
district court for the Southern District of New York in United States v. Para-
mount Famous Lasky Corporation 2 found 3 that the activities of the defendant
producers and distributors, including the agreement to adopt and to use the
Standard Form Contract, with its compulsory arbitration clause, constituted
a conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act.4 As a
result of the affirmance 5 of this decree by the United States Supreme Court,
the question arose as to what effect the decision must have on thousands of
contracts made in the Standard Form by distributors and exhibitors through-
out the country.
In United Artists Corporation v. Piller,0 a distributor recently sought to
enforce the contract without the arbitration clause, on the theory that although
this clause was invalid under the Paramount decision, the remaining portions
of the contract were enforceable. The North Dakota court decided that the
entire contract was unenforceable, on the grounds that the contract, involun-
tarily entered into by the exhibitor, was directly concerned with the purpose
of the conspiracy in restraint of trade. Although there is respectable authority
to the contrary,7 the general tendency seems to be in accord with the principal
1. For a general discussion of the problems leading to the adoption of the
Standard contract, see J. Byron McCormick, Some Legal Problems of tho
Motion Picture Industry (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 316, 407; Lewis, Distributing
Motion Pictures (1928) 7 HARv. Bus. Ruv. 267. For a popular discussion eulo-
gizing the efforts of the industry toward self-regulation, see Barrows, Motion
Pictures-Success through Self-Regulation, (1932) 85 REv. oF REv. 32. This
article is criticized for alleged inaccuracies in facts in (1932) 49 Cmusmim
CENTURY 564. For an account of the Trade Practice Conference of October
10-15, 1927, at which the proposed Standard contract was discussed, see the
report of FANNERY, TRADE PRACTICE CONFERENCE FOR THE MIOTION PICrunn-
INDUSTRY (Government Printing Office, 1928).
2. "One can hardly imagine a more direct restraint upon trade than an
agreement between competitors in an open market not to trade except upon
terms they have fixed in advance." 34 F. (2d) 984, 988 (S. D. N. Y. 1929).
Note the criticism of the decision and its probable effect in (1931) 40 YALE
L. J. 640. The "liquidation" of some $12,000,000 worth of these contracts has
now practically been completed. Because of the old time enmity which exists
between the distributor and the exhibitor, enhanced by a business depression
which has forced exhibitors to economize in every way possible, most of the
exhibitors took advantage of the Paramount decision to avoid their Standard
form contracts.
3. The decree should be examined for the exact prohibitions of the court's
injunction. See Decree in United States v. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp.,
E 45-100, January 21, 1930.
4. 26 STAT. 209 (1891); 15 U. S. C. §§ 1-7, 15 (1927).
5. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U. S. 30 (1930).
6. 244 N. W. 20 (N. D. 1932).
7. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. Bi-Metallic Investment Co., 42 F. (2d) S73
(D. Colo. 1930); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. National Theatre Corp.,
49 F. (2d) 64 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931); Fox Film Corp. v. Buchanan, 17 La. App.
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case in declaring the entire contract unenforceable.8
The argument advanced by the distributor that the contract is severable
seems to be without merit. The arbitration clause is the essence of the con-
tract in that it provides the machinery for the regulation of the relations be-
tween the distributor and the exhibitor. Its importance is illustrated by the
provision which gives the exhibitor the right to object to receiving any film
which he feels will be offensive in his community because of religious or social
subject matter. Disputes as to the validity of an exhibitor's objections are to
be reviewed immediately by the arbitration board. With the arbitration clause
eliminated the exhibitor is practically deprived of an adequate remedy, since
a successful resort to the courts, with its accompanying delays and expense,
could not compensate the exhibitor for the injury resulting from the forced
suspension of a business vitally dependent upon continuous operation. More-
over, the arbitration article itself provides for the submission of all claims
and controversies arising under the contract to the arbitration board before
either party resorts to judicial proceedings. And since the avowed purpose
of the entire contract and arbitration agreement is to establish a sphere of
self-government for the industry, it seems beyond doubt that the arbitration
clause is vital and of the essence of the contract.
It has been argued by the distributor D that the standard contract is not a
part of the illegal conspiracy, but is collateral to it; that the defendant exhibi-
tor is a stranger to the conspiracy; and that therefore an action can be main-
tained on the contract against him.10 This view is apparently erroneous, for
in the Piller case and similar instances, the distributor is suing on the identical
contract which was the evidence of the conspiracy and the object of the restrain-
ing decree in the Paramount case. The enforcement of the very instrumentality
of the conspiracy itself, as attempted by the distributor in the Pllr case,
falls within the interdiction of the Supreme Court that an action cannot bo
maintained on a contract which is a part of an unlawful conspiracy.11 Fur-
thermore, it cannot be validly maintained that by defending on the grounds
of the 'illegality of the contract sued upon, the defendant exhibitor attempts
285, 136 So. 197 (1931); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distribution Corp. v. Bijou
Theatre Co., 50 F. (2d) 908 (D. Mass. 1931).
8. Vitagraph, Inc. v. Theatre Realty Co., 50 F. (2d) 907 (E. D. Pa. 1931);
Fox Film Corp. v. Tri-State Theatres Corp., 6 P. (2d) 135 (Idaho 1931); Fox
Film Corp. v. C. & M. Amusement Co., 58 F. (2d) 337 (S. D. Ohio 1932);
see Majestic Theatre Co. v. United Artists Corp., 43 F. (2d) 991 (D. Conn,
1930).
9. See cases cited supra note 7.
10. Under the rule established in Connelly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184
U. S. 540 (1902). See also Wilder Manufacturing Co. v. Corn Products Co.,
239 U. S. 165 (1914); Small Co. v. Lamborn & Co., 267 U. S. 248 (1925);
Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 46 F. (2d) 511 (D. Maine
1931); Sinclair Refining Co. v. Wilson Gas & Oil Co., 52 F. (2d) 974 (W. D,
S. C. 1931). It may be of significance that in all the above cases the contracts
were executed, while in the instant case, the court is concerned with an execu-
tory contract.
11. Continental Wall Paper Company v. Voight & Sons Co., 212 U. S. 227
(1907). Justice Harlan who also spoke for the court in the Connolly case, supra
note 10, distinguished it from the Wallpaper case and held that where a suit is
brought on a contract which is not collateral to, but a part of, an illegal com-
bination in violation of the Sherman Act, there can be no recovery on it.
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to test the illegality of the combination collaterally,12 for this was settled
against the distributors in the Paramount case. Since the contract is illegal,
an action on it by either party is precluded, in accordance with the familiar
rule that the courts will leave the parties to illegal contracts where it finds
them.. 3
But a different question is presented where the distributor sues in equity
for an injunction and damages against the exhibitor for copyright infringe-
ment. In such a situation, the exhibitor' may not object that the distributor
is a member of a combination in restraint of trade, 4 for the courts take the
view that the illegality of a combination cannot be interposed as a defense to
suits for infringement of copyright.'5  Thus if the exhibitor, erroneously rely-
ing on the Paramount decision, exhibits pictures after the time permitted in
the license agreement, he will be liable for statutory damages and will not be
allowed to say that the distributor must sue on the contract rather than in
equity for copyright infringement. It thus appears that the distributor may,
in spite of the Paramount decision, assert these claims in equity, against which
the illegality of the combination is no defense. Aside from this equitable
remedy, however, the distributor will not be permitted to sue on a contract
which has been declared illegal by the court as the very instrumentality of
the conspiracy in the Paramount ease.10
At the present time, the lot of the exhibitor is even worse than before the
invalidating of the contract, for each distributor now makes his own contract,
and includes therein more onerous provisions than those appearing in the
Standard Form. It is learned, however, that a new contract is being prepared
which will provide for a fair system of compulsory arbitration without the
coercive features of the conspiracy heretofore condemned. Nothing in the
decree prohibits the self-regulation of the industry by this means. 7 The first
12. Geddes v. Anaconda Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590 (1920).
13. Levy v. Kansas City, Kan., 168 Fed. 524 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909).
14. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distribution Corp. v. Bijou Theatre Co., supra,
note 7; decision modified in 59 F. (2d) 70 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932); Vitagraph, Inc.
v. Grabaski, 46 F. (2d) 813 (W. D. Mich. 1931); Tiffany Productions Inc.
v. Dewing, 50 F. (2d) 911 (D. Md. 1931).
15. Motion Picture Patents v. Ulman, 186 Fed. 174 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1910); U. S. Fire Escape Counterbalance Co. v. Joseph Halsted Co., 195 Fed.
295 (N. D. Ill. 1912); Radio Corp. of America v. Majestic Distributors, 53
F. (2d) 641 (D. Conn. 1931); National Electric Products Corp. v. Circle
Flexible Conduit Co., 57 F. (2d) 219 (E. D. N. Y. 1931).
16. The growing tendency of the courts to look with disfavor upon other
provisions of the contract is illustrated by the decision in Younglaus v. Omaha
Film Board of Trade, 60 F. (2d) 538 (D. Neb. 1932). At the suit of an exhi-
bitor who claimed to be injured thereby, the court enjoined the enforcement
of the Uniform Zoning and Protection Plan, made pursuant to Article 6 of
the Standard Form Contract, as a violation of the Sherman Act. By the
Zoning Plan, the distributors had promised to give "protection" to certain
theatres over others in the same competitive territory against the showing at
a rival theatre, according to a maximum schedule set forth in the plan. Its
provisions applied to contracts already made, to suspend the delivery of films
under such contracts, until the protection period provided in the other con-
tracts had been fulfilled.
17. See section 3, decree in U. S. v. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp., supra
note 3.
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attempts have failed because the methods of enforcement took too little account
of the just claims of the exhibitors and the interest of the public.
REfXAMINATION AND ALLOWANCE OF ATTORNEYS' FEEs UNDER SECTION 60 (D)
OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
SECTION 60 (d)l of the Bankruptcy Act provides that payments by a debtor
"in contemplation of the filing of a petition by or against him . . . to an
attorney . . . solicitor in equity or proctor in admiralty for services to be
rendered, . . . shall be reexamined . . . on the petition of the trustee or
any creditor, and . . . held valid to the extent of a reasonable amount . . .
by the court . . . " In In re David Bell Scarves, Incorporated,2 a corporation
being unable to meet its maturing obligations paid an attorney a $2500 retainer
to negotiate with its creditors for a cash settlement, and in case the creditors
would not agree thereto, to arrange for the cofitinuance of the business under
an equity receivership. The attorney's efforts -were unsuccessful and twelve
days later an involuntary petition was filed against the corporation, which was
forthwith adjudicated a bankrupt. Pursuant to section 60 (d), the trustee filed
a petition for the reexamination of the retainer by the referee. The attorney
appeared and challenged the referee's jurisdiction, but the objection was over-
ruled by the referee, who after a hearing ordered the attorney to return $2000
to the trustee. On appeal, the court pointed out that the sole issue presented
was one of the referee's jurisdiction, and in affirming the referee's order held
that the advance payment for the services to be renderel in taking steps to
prevent bankruptcy -was clearly in contemplation of bankruptcy, and there-
for properly reexaminable by the referee.
The summary jurisdiction conferred upon the referee by section 60(d) is
sui generis in that it may be exercised irrespective of the usual prerequisites 3
to summary proceedings.4  To present a case within its terms the payment
must be made by the debtor to his attorney "in contemplation of the filing of
the petition." In interpreting this phrase, the courts, by an analogy to de-
cisions concerning gifts in contemplation of death,5 have required not merely
that the debtor have knowledge of the imminency of bankruptcy, but that he
be influenced thereby in making the payment.6 Since the section does not define
1. Bankruptcy Act, § 60(d), 11 U. S. C. § 96(d) (1926).
2. Decided Nov. 7, 1932 (C. C. A. 2d).
3. See Note (1932) 42 YAIa L. J. 262. Unless a case is clearly within
the terms of this section, with respect to property transferred to an attorney
before the filing of the petition, a plenary action must be brought against the
attorney as an adverse claimant, unless his claim is "colorable." With respect
to property transferred to him after the filing of the petition, he is subject
to the referee's summary jurisdiction since the property is regarded as in
"custodia legis." Cf. In re Corbett, 104 Fed. 872 (E. D. Wis. 1900).
4. See In re Wood & Henderson, 210 U. S. 246, 253 (1908).
5. See, for example, United States v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102 (1931).
6. Tripp v. Mitschrich, 211 Fed. 424 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914); Quinn v. Union
National Bank, 32 F. (2d) 762 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929); In re David Bell Scarves,
Inc., 52 F. (2d) 755 (S. D. N. Y. 1931) (district court's opinion in the principal
case).
the character of the services to be rendered by the attorney, but emphasizes
the debtor's intent, the nature of the services becomes material to the question
of jurisdiction only to the ex\tent that it indicates such intent The issue of
jurisdiction has been raised in only two cases. One has subjected to the referee's
examination a mortgage executed to an attorney to secure services rendered
in the preparation of an assignment for the benefit of creditors,s vhile the
other has excluded from his examination a retainer paid for the collection of
the proceeds due the debtor on a fire insurance policy.0 The result reached
in the principal case would seem reasonable. Certainly a debtor acts very much
in contemplation of a result which he employs counsel to avoid.10
Where jurisdiction exists, or has been assumed, the purely factual question
of the reasonableness of the particular prepayment is always presented for
the referee's determination. But beyond this, the instant case suggests the
further question, of the interpretation to be given to section 60(d) in order
to determine whether the nature of the services is such that the referee must
sustain the prepayment to a reasonable extent, or whether lie must invalidate
the prepayment by ordering its full return. A few courts have held 11 that
the services contemplated by section 60(d) are identical with those included
in section 64(b) (3),12 which grants priority to a debt due an attorney 'or
the . . . services actually rendered . . . to the bankrupt in voluntary and
involuntary cases, as the court may allow." Services for which an allowance
may be made under this section must be rendered in assisting the bankrupt
to perform his duties13 "in aid of the estate and its administration." 14 One
objection to an interpretation which construes section 60 (d) according to
7. See Tripp v. Mitschrich, supra note 6, at 428.
8. Slattery v. Dillon, 17 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
9. Tripp v. Mitschrich, supra note 6.
10. See Furth v. Stahl, 205 Pa. St. 439, 443, 55 AtI. 29, 30 (1903).
11. In re Christianson, 175 Fed. 867 (D. N. D. 1910); In re Secord, 296
Fed. 231 (W. D. Wash. 1923); see In re Kross, 96 Fed. 816, 818 (S. D. N. Y.
1899); GImn'r, CoLIum ON BANKRUPTCY (2d ed. 1931) 925.
12. Bankruptcy Act, § 64(b)(3), 11 U. S. C. § 104 (b) (3) (1926).
13. These duties are defined by Bankruptcy Act, § 7, 11 U. S. C. § 25 (1926).
14. The services compensable under this interpretation include preparing
and filing the bankrupt's schedules, procuring an adjudication and reference,
bringing the bankrupt before the referee for examination (In re Kross; In re
Secord, both supra note 11), attending the bankrupt at his examination (In re
Mayer, 101 Fed. 695 (E. D. Wis. 1900). Contra: In re Rosenthal & Lehman,
120 Fed. 848 (E. D. Mo. 1902); In re Christianson, supra note 11 (attending
the creditors' meeting). In re Duran Mercantile Company, 199 Fed. 9G1 (D. N.
M. 1912) (procuring a reduction of taxes on the estate and a stay order against
attachments of the debtor's property). On the other hand, those services are
excluded which are rendered for the bankrupt's personal benefit and protection,
such as filing the petition and securing the order of discharge of the bank-
rupt. In re Brundin, 112 Fed. 306 (D. Minn. 1901); cf. In r Malliel, 29 F.
(2d) 790 (D. Mass. 1928), Similarly as to preparing a general assignment for
the benefit of creditors, opposing the progress of the bankruptcy proceedings
(Randolph v. Scruggs, 190 U. S. 533 (1903)), filing a plea in abatement in an
action against the bankrupt (In re Taylor, 280 Fed. 127 (D. Wyo. 1922)), or




section 64(b) (3), is that services rendered subsequent to the filing of the
petition would be included under section 60 (d) *15 And it is generally agreed 10
that compensation for services to be rendered subsequent to the filing of the
petition should be allowed only under section 64(b) (3), pursuant to notice re-
quired to be issued by the referee to the creditors.17  Moreover, the compre-
lensive reference to "services to be rendered" and the inclusion of "solicitors
in equity and proctors in admiralty" in section 60(d) appear to negate the
contention that the character of the services contemplated is as limited as
that within section 64(b) (3). In fact one court has gone so far as to suggest
that the services contemplated by section 60(d) may be any kind of legal
services required by the debtor in the general course of his business.1 8
By far the majority of the decisions, however, have avoided either extreme
by the generalization that services for which compensation is allowable under
section 60(d) are such as are "germane to the general purposes of the Bank-
ruptcy Act," i.e., the subjection of the bankrupt's assets to administration and
distribution to the creditors.19 Whether such an interpretation restricts com-
pensable services solely to those which might have benefited the creditors
is not clear. Compensation for services rendered entirely for the personal
benefit of the bankrupt, such as the defense of a bankrupt indicted for a
crime,20 or charged with contempt,21 has been disallowed. But compensation
for advice to the debtor concerning his financial difficulties, 22 : for negotiations
with creditors for a compromise or extension of time to the debtor,23 for the
preparation of an assignment for the benefit of creditors,24 for services rendered
as counsel for the receiver of the debtor corporation, 25 or for arrangements
made for the filing of an involuntary petition,20 has been allowed.
A definite limitation has evidently been placed upon the general terms of
section 60(d) in requiring an attorney to return to the trustee all fees pre-
paid by the bankrupt to obtain purely personal services. At the same time,
15. Such was the decision in In re Christianson; In re Secord, both supra
note 11.
16. Pratt v. Bothe, 130 Fed. 670 (C. C. A. 6th, 1904); It re Stolp, 199
Fed. 488 (E. D. Wis. 1912); In re Rolnick, 294 Fed. 817 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923);
In re Lang, 20 F. (2d) 239 (E. D. Pa. 1927).
17. General Order XLII requires such notice to state by whom and in what
amount compensation is claimed, and to be sent pursuant to Bankruptcy Act,
§ 58, 11 U. S. C. § 94 (1926). Cf. In re Lahongrais, 5 F. (2d) 899 (C, C. A.
1st, 1925); In re Klein-Moffett Company, 27 F. (2d) 444 (D. Md. 1928); In ro
Falk, 30 F. (2d) 607 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
18. Pratt v. Bothe, supra note 16.
19. In re Habegger, 139 Fed. 623 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905); In re Stolp; In ro
Lang, both supra note 16; In re Klein-Moffett Company, supra note 17; see
In re Rolnick, supra note 16, at 819; In re Falk, supra note 17, at 609; Quinn
v. Union National Bank, supra note 6, at 765.
20. In re Habegger, supra note 19; see In re Rolnick, supra note' 16, at
819.
21. See Quinn v. Union National Bank, supra note 6, at 765.
22. In re Lang, supra note 16.
23. In re Klein-Moffett Company, supra note 17; cf. In re Stolp, supra
note 16. Contra: In re Habegger, supra note 19.
24. In re Lang, supra note 16.
25. In re Klein-Moffett Company, supra note 17.
26. See In re Falk, supra note 17, at 609.
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however, it is recognized that there are legal services not inimical to the pur-
poses of the Bankruptcy Act,27 other than those included within section 64(b)
(3), of which the bankrupt should be permitted to avail himself, and which
because of his precarious financial position, he may be unable to obtain except
by prepayment.28
REVERSAL OF JUVENILE COURT COM5MITMENT FOR FAILURE TO APPLY
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A MiNOR charged with acts which would have amounted to a felony under the
criminal law, was recently committed by a New York juvenile court on the
charge of delinquency. Upon appeal, the commitment was reversed' on the
ground that although other evidence had been heard by the trial judge amply
substantiating the charge, the only testimony properly admissible was appellants
own confession, the appellant not having been confronted with the corroborating
witnesses. The court also stressed the fact that no guardian ad litera had been
appointed and no attorney had represented the child. A vigorous dissent argued
that since all the circumstances clearly indicated a fair trial, technical rules
of criminal procedure should not be relied upon to reverse a commitment fully
sustained by a consideration of all the facts.
The purpose of the juvenile court statutes is to aid the offender in securing
a position within the societal organization, and their procedural provisions are
designed accordingly. This fact alone would seem to render irrelevant and
obstructive those guaranties of the criminal law which protect the individual
from oppression by the community. However, there is constant pressure upon
the courts functioning under these statutes to recognize such safeguards, al-
though the reason for their enforcement has disappeared. Objections to the
jurisdiction of the juvenile courts have been raised in various ways. Although
the complaint need not have the particularity necessary for a criminal indict-
ment,2 the judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally as void if there
is a failure substantially to comply with the terms of the statute.3 Similarly,
27. The different results reached in the cases cited in note 23 indicate the
ambiguity of the "germane" test.
28. That there is no strict requirement that the payment be made at the
time the employment of the attorney is secured, as long as the payment is
made and the services are to be performed before bankruptcy, see In rc Cum-
mins, 196 Fed. 224 (S. D. N. Y. 1912); In rc Klein-Moffett Company, szzpra
note 17.
1. People v. Lewis, 235 App. Div. 559, 257 N. Y. Supp. 457 (3d Dep't 1932).
2. State v. Johnson, 196 Iowa 300, 194 N. W. 202 (1923); see In re Gutierrez,
46 Cal. App. 94, 188 Pac. 1004 (1920).
3. Ex parte Burner, 23 Cal. App. 637, 139 Pac. 90 (1914); State v. Rose, 125
La. 1080, 52 So. 165 (1910); State v. Renaud, 157 La. 776, 103 So. 101 (1925);
Ex parte Satterthwaite, 52 Mont. 550, 160 Pac. 346 (1916); People v. N. Y.
Nursery and Child's Hospital, 190 App. Div. 562, 180 N. Y. Supp. 372 (2d Dep't
1920); cf. State v. Johnson, 131 La. 8, 58 So. 1015 (1912) (chtirge before juvenile
court suffices when affidavit sets forth in general terms the facts constituting
neglect or delinquency); Ex parte Watson, 157 N. C. 340, 72 S. E. 1049 (1911)
(child will not be discharged upon habeas corpus because of irregularities in
the order or commitment); Ex parte Ramseur, 81 Tex. Cr. 413, 195 S. W.
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the proceedings may be set aside where the parent or custodian has received
no notice of a hearing.4 However, the fact that the child's legal residence may
not be within the state does not deprive the juvenile court of jurisdiction 6 since
all minors found to be dependent or delinquent within the territorial limits of
the court's jurisdiction are subject to its decrees.0
A further ground for objection to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court may
exist if the offender is over the statutory age limit at the time of trial. It has
been successfully argued that these courts have no jurisdiction to try an offender
who may be thirty or forty years old at the time of trial.7 On the other hand,
the courts maintaining that the time of the commission of the offense should
control, rest their decisions upon the principle that it is unjust to allow juvenile
delinquency to ripen into a punishable crime merely because the offender ex-
ceeded the statutory age limit at the time of apprehension.8 Marriage is likewise
a ground for objecting to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, but the majority
of courts and the sounder policy endorse the view that whether the offender
is married before or after the court takes control of the case, the juvenile court's
jurisdiction is not affected.9
The purpose of these acts does not require the detention of the child before
a hearing unless it is absolutely necessary to insure his appearance or unless
the child is in such a neglected or dependent state that his interests are best
864 (1917) (where child is convicted as a delinquent after the original felony
indictment has been dismissed, if no complaint and information is filed, the
defendant is entitled to release on habeas corpus).
4. In re Paulson, 212 Mich. 502, 180 N. W. 386 (1920); In ro Petrovich, 222
Mich. 79, 192 N. W. 657 (1923); Ez parte Satterthwaite, supra note 3; People
v. N. Y. Nursery and Child's Hospital, supra note 3. Contra: Bleier v. Crouse, 13
Ohio App. 69 (1920); of. In re Antonopulos, 171 App. Div. 659, 157 N. Y.
Supp. 587 (2d Dep't 1916) (after adjudication of child's dependency, parents
are judicially deprived of custody so that in later adoption proceedings it is
not necessary to give them notice).
5. Ex parte Maginnis, 162 Cal. 200, 121 Pac. 723 (1912) ; Hartman v. Henry,
280 Mo. 478, 217 S. W. 987 (1920); Blanchard v. State, 30 N. T. 459, 238 Pac.
1004 (1925).
6. See Ex parte Maginnis, supra note 5; Blanchard v. State, supra note 5;
cf. Ex parte Bowers, 78 Ore. 390, 153 Pac. 412 (1915) (county which first
obtains jurisdiction retains it).
7. Davis v. State, 21 Ala. App. 649, 111 So. 645 (1927); State v. Adams, 310
Mo. 157, 289 S. W. 948 (1926); Strachner v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. 89, 215 S. W.
305 (1919).
8. Mattingly v. Commonwealth, 171 Ky. 222, 188 S. W. 370 (1916); Cody
v. Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 849, 276 S. W. 970 (1925); State v. Coble, 181 N. C,
554, 107 S. E. 132 (1921) ; see (1928) 28 CoL. L. Rpv. 381 (suggesting that the
place of incarceration controls and is not dependent on which court takes juris-
diction but on the facts of each case).
9. Ex parte Willis, 30 Cal. App. 188, 157 Pac. 819 (1916); McPherson v.
Day, 162 Iowa 251, 144 N. W. 4 (1913); State v. District Court, 77 Mont. 290,
250 Pac. 973 (1926); see In re Hook, 95 Vt. 497, 115 Atl. 730 (1922); of. In ro
Lundy, 82 Wash. 148, 143 Pac. 885 (1914) (previous marriage, annulled by the
time of the trial, does not remove child from jurisdiction of juvenile court).
Contra: Ex parte Lewis, 3 Cal. App. 738, 86 Pac. 996 (1906); State v. Eisen,
53 Ore. 297, 99 Pac. 282 (1909), rehearing denied, 53 Ore. 297, 100 Pac. 257
(1909).
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served by immediately taking him into custody.'0 If there is no statutory
provision for detention pending appeal, a child can secure his release by habeas
corpus proceedings."1 Similarly, an officer taking a child into custody under
the provisions of these acts is not ordinarily liable in an action for false im-
prisonment,' 2 but such statutes, being in derogation of the common law and
depriving the minor of his liberty, are often strictly construed so as to require
a substantial compliance with their provisions in order to render officials acting
under them immune.13
Perhaps the most significant departure from the principles of the criminal law
is the abolition in juvenile court proceedings of the right to a trial by jury.
Inasmuch as the juvenile court statutes are not criminal in nature, 14 juries are
considered to have no place in the proceedings,' 5 and objections on this ground
are of no avail either to declare the act unconstitutional 10 or to have the case
remanded for a new trial with a jury.17 However, all the technicalities attendant
upon a criminal trial are applicable to juvenile court proceedings when the
offender on trial is an adult.'8 Juvenile courts frequently are accorded juris-
diction over adults for the offense of contributing to the delinquency of a
minor,19, but where the statutes have attempted to subject the adult to the
summary procedure of the juvenile court, denying to him the accustomed safe-
guards of a criminal trial, they have been held unconstitutional2o In only one
state has the juvenile court succeeded in applying a chancery procedure to the
10. Lenroot and Lundberg, Juvenile Courts at Work, U. S. Children's Bureau,
Publication no. 141 (1925) p. 52; FLEXNER AND BALDWiN, J uvEmE CouR 's AND
PROBATION (1916) 23.
11. Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 Atl. 678 (1923).
12. Weber v. Doust, 84 Wash. 330, 146 Pac. 623 (1915).
13. McAlmond v. Trippel, 93 Cal. App. 584, 269 Pac. 937 (1928); Scott v.
Flowers, 60 Neb. 675, 84 N. W. 81 (1900); cf. (1929) 17 CALIF. L. REV. 71.
14. Re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 96 Pac. 563 (1908); see Ex parte Ak Peen, 51
Cal. 280 (1876); Sylvester v. Commonwealth, 253 Mass. 244, 148 N. E. 449
(1925); State v. Buckner, 300 Mo. 359, 254 S. W. 179 (1923); Odgen v. State,
162 Wis. 500, 156 N. W. 476 (1916). Contra: Miller v. State, 82 Tex. Cr. 495,
200 S. W. 389 (1918).
15. FLExNEx AND BALDwIN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 64; Fle.mer and Oppen-
heimer, The Legal Aspect of the Juvenile Court (1923) 57 Am. L. REv. 65; Lou,
JuvENILE CouRTs (1927) 137.
16. Es parte Januszewski, 196 Fed. 123 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1911); Ro Sharp,
supra note 14; State v. Buckner, supra note 14; Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213
Pa. 48, 62 Atl. 198 (1905).
17. Prince v. State, 19 Ala. App. 495, 98 So. 320 (1923) ; see Ex parte Daedler,
194 Cal. 320, 228 Pac. 467 (1924). The ruling is, of course, otherwise where the
statute allows a jury trial.
18. State v. Eisen, supra note 9; State v. Dunn, 53 Ore. 304, 99 Pac. 278
(1909), rehearing denied, 53 Ore. 304, 100 Pac. 258 (1909); Mill v. Brown, 31
Utah 473, 88 Pac. 609 (1907); State v. Marsh, 126 Wash. 142, 217 Pac. 705
(1923).
19. HUSTON, SociAL WELFARE LAWS OF THE FORTY-EIGHT STATES (1930);
Lou, op. cit. supra, note 15, at 55.




trial of adults under some circumstances, and even there, criminal prosecutions
are reserved for the more serious cases coming before the court.
21
The reliance placed by the court in the instant case upon the rule that a
commitment may not be obtained solely upon an uncorroborated confession
clearly tends to vitiate the effectiveness of the juvenile court statute. Other
courts passing upon similar questions have reached conclusions contrary to the
principles expressed.22 The reason for the exclusion by the New York court of
the additional testimony supporting the commitment was apparently the fact
that the offender was not confronted by the witnesses. But a guaranty of the
right to a public trial and to be confronted by witnesses is not essential to
the validity of the statute.23 Indeed, such procedure in the juvenile court is
often undesirable, 24 and in many instances has been abolished in practice.2 5
Judges interviewing the witnesses separately are thereby enabled to arrive
at a clearer understanding of the individual problems. Nor is representation
by attorney particularly desirable in juvenile court proceedings, 20 inasmuch as
the lawyer, trained in the use of legal technicalities, may introduce an element
quite foreign to the spirit of the juvenile court.
Although substantial justice may be secured in an individual case by reversal
of the commitment on a technical error of criminal law, there is nothing to
gain by the introduction of such factors into juvenile court procedure, A pre-
ferable method of review might be to reverse a commitment on the sole ground
of abuse of discretion. A determination of this question could be made upon a
consideration of the record.27 By this rule, the interests of the offender would
4be adequately protected by the power of the appellate court to set aside a
commitment where the lower court has acted in an unreasonable, prejudicial
or arbitrary manner.28
21. THE CHILD, THE CLINIC AND THE CouRT (1925) 274.
22. People v. Barbera, 78 Cal. App. 277, 248 Pac. 304 (1926) (corroborated
testimony'not essential); Taylor v. Means, 139 Ga. 578, 77 S. E. 373 (1913)
(this case, however, would seem to have warranted a reversal for an abuse of
discretion, although the court correctly refused to reverse on the evidential
point) ; cf. Van Waters, The Socialization of Juvenile Court Procedure (1923)
13 J. CRalm. L. 61; Testimony of Judge Mosher, infra note 26; Testimony of
Justice Levy in Proceedings of the Conference on Juvenile Court Standards,
U. S. Children's Bureau, publication no. 97 (1922) p. 62.
23. See Re Sharp, supra note 14; State v. Buckner, supra note 14; Mill v.
Brown, supra note 18.
24. Juvenile-Court Standards, U. S. Children's Bureau, Publication no. 121
(1923) p. 5; Leuroot and Lundberg, supra note 10, at 124; Lou, op. cit. supra
note 15, at 132; FLEXNER AND BALDWIN, op. cit. supra note 10, at 53.
25. Lenroot and Lundberg, supra note 10, at 125; Flexner and Oppenheimer,
supra note 15, at 87.
26. FLEXNER AND BALDWIN, op. cit, supra note 10, at 64; Lou, op. cit. supra
note 15, at 138; Testimony of Judge Mosher, Proceedings of the Fourth Annuai
Conference of the New York State Association of Judges of County Children's
Courts (1928) p. 74; (1931) 16 ST. Louis L. REv. 63, 67; cf. Bradway, Juvenile
Delinquency (1929) 2 So. CALIF. L. Rnv. 128. The services of an attorney upon
appeal, of course, are quite necessary.
27. Failure to submit the record for review has been held a ground for re-
versal. Martin v. State, 210 Ala. 44, 97 So. 57 (1923).
28. Cf. Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328, 100 N. E. 892 (1913); Cullins v.
Williams, 156 Ky. 57, 160 S. W. 733 (1913).
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SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENTS AGAINST RECEIVERS AND TRUSTEFS IN BANKRUPTCY
IN suits against receivers and trustees in bankruptcy arising from their ad-
ministration of the estate, courts have carefully differentiated proceedings
against these officers 1 in their official capacity from those brought against them
as individuals. The former type of case, in the absence of statutory provision
to the contrary,2 must be tried by the bankruptcy court unless leave to bring
suit elsewhere is obtained from that tribunal, while the latter class is not
subject to this restriction.3 In accordance with these principles, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently affirmed an order enjoining an
action brought in the state court against a receiver and trustee in bankruptcy
in his representative capacity for negligent non-performance of covenants in
a lease confirmed by him.4 Insofar as the suit was directed against the
defendant personally, however, no injunction was sought. Such a distinction,
arising out of the desire of the bankruptcy courts to retain control over dis-
tribution of the assets in their custody, raises the problem as to the assets
against which the plaintiff must proceed to obtain satisfaction of his judgment.
Judgments against receivers and trustees based upon acts related to their
official duties are payable out of the bankrupts funds.5 Such judgments are
classed as costs of administration, a category which includes expenses spe-
cifically approved by the court,( generally embracing therein all costs of carry-
ing on the bankrupt's business. 7 In distribution of the assets, costs of ad-
ministration have priority over general creditors' claims.8 However, they
occupy a less favored position than the claims of secured creditorsO except in
instances where a court order gives them precedence, lienholders waive their
priority,'0 or it is of urgent public interest that the business continue in
operation.1 1 Whether or not they are to be paid before taxes is a much dis-
cussed question upon which the cases are in conflict.' 2 Receivers' certificates
1. No distinction is made as between receiver and trustee with respect to
suability. Cf. 5 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY (3d ed. 1923) §§ 2330-2343.
2. 24 STAT. 554 (1887), 28 U. S. C. § 125 (1926).
3. In re Kalb & Berger Mfg. Co., 165 Fed. 895 (C. C. A. 2d, 1908); Berman
v. Smith, 171 Fed. 735 (N. D. Ga. 1909); 5 REMINGTON, op. Cit. supra note 1,
§ 2336.
4. Vass v. Conron Bros. Co., 59 F. (2d) 969 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
5. In re Kalb & Berger Mfg. Co.; Berman v. Smith, both supra note 3;
Camp v. Barney, 4 Hun 373 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1875).
6. In re Erie Lumber Co., 150 Fed. 817 (S. D. Ga. 1906); In re Restein,
162 Fed. 986 (E. D. Pa. 1908).
7. In re Williams' Estate, 156 Fed. 934 (C. C. A. 9th, 1907) ; In re John W.
Farley & Co., 227 Fed. 378 (C. C. A. 7th, 1915); see Wire Wheel Corporation
v. Fayette Bank & Trust Co., 30 F. (2d) 318, 321 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928).
8. 30 STAT. 563, (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 104 b (1) (3) (1926).
9. In re Williams' Estate, supra note 7; In re Hansen & Birch, 292 Fed. 898
(N. D. Ga. 1923). Contra: In re Tebo, 101 Fed. 419 (D. W. Va. 1900).
10. In re Veler, 249 Fed. 633 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918).
11. Anderson v. Condict, 93 Fed. 349 (C. C. A. 7th, 1899); Klein v. Jewett,
26 N. J. Eq. 474 (1875); Note (1916) 64 U. of PA. L. REV. 399, 400.
12. In re Alaska Fishing & Development Co., 167 Fed. 875 (W. D. Wash.
1909); see In Re Prince & Waiter, 131 Fed. 546, 550 (M. D. Pa. 1904). Contra:
In re Wyley Co., 292 Fed. 900 (N. D. Ga. 1923); In rc A. E. Fountain, Inc.,
295 Fed. 873 (S. D. N. Y. 1924).
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are conclusive evidence of such claims, but rank before other authorized expenses
only by express order of court.13 Receivership expenses, however, are given
priority over those of the trustee, being considered an "actual and necessary
cost of preserving the estate subsequent to filing the petition." 14
Judgments against the personal assets of receivers and' trustees in bank-
ruptcy can b; had in plenary suits brought against them as individuals for
acts done negligently- or in excess of authority while administering the bank-
rupt's estate I5 and in cases where they assume liability by contract.10 It has
been suggested that receivers and trustees be indemnified for such losses from
the funds in the court's custody,1 7 on the theory that the creditors, who receive
the benefit of a competent administration, should bear the risk of the officers'
misfeasance. Allowance of such an item in the trustee's accounting would
doubtless lie within the bankruptcy court's discretion. But this solution seems
improbable in view of the courts' protective attitude toward creditors, who will
not be made to suffer for the trustee's negligence 18 and are entitled to sur-
charge his accounts for unnecessary expense items.19 Levy on his official bond
has been suggested, 20 and in at least one instance allowed.21 This is consistent
with actions allowed on other types -of official bonds, in which the injured party
may at his election either recover a personal judgment against the officer,
which will generally constitute at least prima facie evidence of the surety's
liability, 22 or bring an action directly on the bond,23 a procedure sanctioned
in this situation by the Bankruptcy Act.24 In any case, however, the officer
13. In re Erie Lumber Co., supra note 6; Wire Wheel Corporation v. Fayette
Bank & Trust Co., supra note 7; In re Alaska Fishing & Development Co., supra
note 12.
14. In re Erlich, 297 Fed. 327 (E. D. Pa. 1924); In re Englander, 39 F,
(2d) 931 (W. D. Pa. 1930); BANKRUPTCY AcT, supra note 8.
15. Treat v. Wooden, 138 Fed. 934 (C. C. D. Mass. 1905); Shapiro v.
Goldman, 253 Mass. 60, 148 N. E. 217 (1925). But cf. In re Hunter, 151 Fed.
904 (E. D. Pa. 1907).
16. Brooklyn Improvement Co. v. Lewis, 136 App. Div. 861, 122 N. Y. Supp.
111 (2d Dep't 1910); Kniteraft Inc. v. Bailey, 124 Misc. 891, 209 N. Y. Supp,
586 (Mun. Ct., 1913).
17. See Treat v. Wooden, supra note 15, at 139; of. In re Hunter, supra
note 15.
18. Adams v. Meyers, Fed. Cas. No. 62 (D. Ore. 1870); see Xing v. Dletz,
12 Pa. 156, 159 (1849).
19. In re Leonard, 177 Fed. 503 (D. Nev. 1910); In re Solantkius, 33 F. (2d)
200 (W. D. Pa. 1929). But of. In re Schoenfeld, 183 Fed. 219 (C. C. A. 3d,
1910).
20. See In re Veler, supra note 10, at 644; United States Worsted Sales
Co. v. Daniel Boone Woolen Mills, 9 F. (2d) 793, 795 (C. C. A. 7th, 1925).
21. United States v. Perkins, 280 Fed. 546 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922); of. United
States v. Union Surety & Guaranty Co., 118 Fed. 482 (S. D. N. Y. 1902).
22. Beauchaine v. MeKinnon, 55 Minn. 318, 56 N. W. 1065 (1803); Barker v.
Wheeler, 60 Neb. 470, 83 N. W. 678 (1900). Contra: Rodini v. Lytle, 17 Mont.
448, 43 Pac. 501 (1896). Some courts make it conclusive evidence. Evans v.
Commonwealth, 8 Watts 398 (Pa. 1839).
23. People v. Smith, 123 Cal. 70, 55 Pac. 765 (1898); Johnson v. Williams'
Administrators, 111 Ky. 289, 63 S. W. 759 (1901).
24. 30 STAT. 558 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 78 (h) (1926).
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must bear the eventual burden, for the surety on payment of the debt is
subrogated to all the creditor's rights including a claim against the principal.2 8
In confirming contracts on behalf of the estate, a trustee may protect himself
by agreement with the other contracting party,20 but this practice obviously
affords no safeguard against ordinary tort claims. Indeed, no method appears
by which receivers or trustees in bankruptcy can avoid personal liability for
negligence or acts done in excess of authority. However, this result is lecs
strict than the English rule holding equity receivers personally accountable on
contracts made in the estate's behalf,27 a rule which is justified from the stand-
point of public policy by the conservatism with which the receivers in that
country administer estates.2 8
MEASURE OF DAMAGES AGAINST JOINT TORTFEASORS UNDER MASsiCHUSETTS
WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
THE considered function of wrongful death legislation is compensation of the
decedents estate and dependents for injuries resulting to them from his death.1
But the statutes are admittedly imperfect instruments to this end, for under
their terms, negligence by the decedent is generally declared to bar all relief,2
although his dependents may be entirely free from fault. Moreover, there is
a uniform failure to realize that the interest compensated is twofold, involving
separate injuries to the estate and to the dependents. 3 The general purpose
of the statutes, however, is to provide an escape from the common law's com-
plete denial of relief.4
Th remedial nature 5 of such legislation is not recognized by Massachusetts,
the purpose of whose act 6 is declared to be punishment of the negligent 'wrong-
doer, rather than compensation for injuries resulting from the wrongful death.
The unique 7 assessment of damages with sole reference to the degree of the
defendant's culpability cannot be reconciled with the prevailing remedial inter-
25. In re Day Lumber Co., 40 F. (2d) 285 (W. D. Wash. 1930); Woodyard
v. Sayre, 90 W. Va. 295, 110 S. E. 689 (1922).
26. Weller v. Stengel, 146 App. Div. 317, 130 N. Y. Supp. 707 (2d Dep't 1911).
27. Burt, Boulton & Hayward v. Bull (1895) 1 Q. B. 276; Clark, Evglish and
American Theories of Receivers' Liabilities (1927) 27 Cor. L. Rnv. 679.
28. Id. at 681.
1. Note (1931) 44 HAnv. L. REv. 980.
2. 2 CooLEY, ToRTs (4th ed. 1932) § 218.
3. Note (1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 980. In many states recovery is limited to
an inadequate sum. The amount varies from $12,500 with a possible $2,500
added in Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. (Brossard, 1931) c. 331.04, to $5,000 in Colorado,
COLO. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) § 2177. The usual limit is $10,000, as in
Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5987, and Massachusetts, infra note 6.
4. CoOLErY, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 211.
5. BURDicx, LAW OF ToRS (4th ed. 1926) § 246. Most of the statutes are
modeled after Lord Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846), which was ex-
pressed to be "for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent (including grand-
parent and step-parent) and child (including grand-child and step-child) 2
6. MAsS. GEN. LAWs (1932) c. 229, §§ 1-11.
7. No other wrongful death statute assesses damages in this way, although
a few others are construed as punitive. See note 17, infra.
19331 NOTES
YALE LAW JOURNAL
pretation of such legislation. This measure of liability expressly excludes
from the jury's consideration any factors, such as life expectancy or earning
power of the deceased, which aid in the scientific ascertainment of the extent
of the injury to be compensated. The test substituted is open to the further
objection that liability arising out of railroad and automobile accidents, which
comprise a large part of the wrongful death actions, is scarcely capable of
accurate determination by the common law theory of negligence.8 The extension
of this uncertain technique to the measure of damages as well as to the existence
of liability is therefore questionable.
While the punitive character of this statute is firmly established in Massachu-
setts law,9 neither the terms of the act nor its judicial history shows a consistent
application of this theory. Under a completely punitive statute, contributory
negligence on the part of the decedent should not save the wrongdoer from
punishment, since his culpability is not lessened thereby. But the act makes
due care by the deceased a condition precedent to recovery. Moreover, in
contrast to the judicial declaration that under the statute, separate actions must
be brought against joint tortfeasors in order that their individual guilt might
be determined and punished,10 it has illogically been held that an allegation of
"willful, wanton and reckless misconduct" does not state a cause of action under
the section 11 holding railroad companies liable for deaths caused by their
negligence.12
The Massachusetts interpretation of its statute was carried to inexorable
finality in the recent case of Porter v. Sorell.'3 An administratrix was there
allowed to collect two judgments obtained in separate actions for the death of
the intestate. The court admitted that this decision was contrary to the common
law rule that satisfaction of a claim against one joint tortfeasor releases all
others,14 but argued that the punitive nature of the statute prohibited any
wrongdoer from evading its penalties by another's payment. No case has been
found which reaches the same conclusion, even in the few states whose wrongful
death acts 1 5 are construed as punitive rather than remedial,10 and frequent
dicta in the Massachusetts cases take the opposite view.17 The holding is
8. REPORT BY COMMITTEE TO STUDY CoImnnNsATION ron AUTOMOBiLns ACCI-
DENTS (Columbia University Research Council, 1932) pp. 32-3; Book Review
(1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 1428, reviewing the committee's report.
9. Hudson v. Lynn & Boston R. R. Co., 185 Mass. 510, 71 N. E. 66 (1904);
Brown v. Thayer, 212 Mass. 392, 99 N. E. 237 (1912).
10. Brown v. Thayer, supra note 9; Nugent v. Boston Consolidated Gas Co.,
238 Mass. 221, 130 N. E. 488 (1921).
11. MASS. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 229, § 3.
12. Foynes v. New York Central R. R., 276 Mass. 89, 177 N. E. 119 (1931);
cf. Cotter v. Boston, R. B. & L. R. Co., 237 Mass. 68, 129 N. E. 426 (1921).
13. 182 N. E. 837 (Mass. 1932).
14. BURDICK, op. cit. supra note 5, at § 236.
15. ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 5696; Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932) §§ 3262, 3263;
N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) §§ 36-101. The New Mexico statute is
punitive only as regards actions against common carriers; for other actions §
102 of the same chapter makes damages compensatory.
16. Jones v. Russell, 206 Ala 215, 89 So. 660 (1921); cf. Myers v. Kennedy,
306 Mo. 268, 267 S. W. 810 (1924).
17. See Oulighan v. Butler, 189 Mass. 287, 293, 75 N. E. 726, 728-9 (1905);
D'Almeida v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co., 209 Mass. 81, 87, 95 N. E. 398, 399
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strictly limited to the situation where the judgments aggregate less than the
maximum statutory recovery. It leaves open, therefore, the problem of recovery
by a plaintiff whose separate judgments for one death exceed that amount.18
The court's zeal to punish negligent tortfeasors seems slightly unrealistic when
it is considered that this action was actually defended by an insurance company
which paid the nominal defendants' liability. Since Massachusetts is the only
state to make liability insurance compulsory for all automobilists,10 a consider-
able number of defendents may be expected to evade the statutory punishment
through vicarious atonement by insurance companies.
PROOF OF THE VALUE OF INTANGMLE PROPERTY UNDER THE REVENUE AcT
A CORPORATION owning a stockyard obtained contracts with Cudahy Packing
Company and Armour and Company by which the packers agreed to operate
plants at the stockyard for a term of years in consideration of cash, buildings
and a large amount of the corporation's stock. After the expiration of this
term the corporation sought to include these contracts in invested capital at
cost for the computation of excess profits, on the ground that they had created
a valuable physical relationship, arising from the location of the packers at
the stockyard and surviving the legal right. The Board of Tax Appeals con-
sidered the evidence insufficient to establish a value for invested capital greater
than that represented by the cash and buildings paid by petitioner.' The
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision on the ground that petitioner
had presented substantial evidence that the value of these expired contract
rights was greater than the sum allowed, and the Board could not ignore
substantial evidence. 2
The Revenue Act distinguishes between intangible and tangible property by
defining intangible property as "patents . . . secret processes . . . good
will . . . and other like property," and tangible property as "notes . *
evidences of indebtedness . . . leaseholds and property not intangible."
Motivated by the practical difficulty of evaluating intangible property, the courts,
(1911) ; Nugent v. Boston Consolidated Gas Co., supra note 11, at 237, 130 N. E.
at 493.
18. The plaintiff is limited to recovery of the $10,000 allowed by the statute,
no matter how many judgments he obtains. Nugent v. Boston Consolidated
Gas Co., supra note 10. The court, therefore, would logically apportion the
damages according to guilt as found by the jury. This, however, seems to run
contrary to the rule that there is no contribution between joint tortfeasors.
The only alternative is to reduce the penalty of one of the wrongdoers arbitrarily.
Neither course fully carries out the punitive purpose of the statute.
19. MAss. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 90, § 34.
1. The Commissioner had apparently held that these contracts were without
value because they had expired before the tax year in question; but had
inconsistently allowed them to be included in invested capital at a value equal
to petitioner's outlay in cash and buildings.
2. Sioux City Stock Yards Co. v. Commissioner, 59 F. (2d) 944 (C. C. A.
8th, 1932). The value of these rights was shown both by their cost to petitioner
and by the fact that a stockyard derives all its profit from handling livestock
for adjacent packers.
3. 40 STAT. 1091 (1919), 26 U. S. C. § 1072 (1926).
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without express reliance on this distinction, 4 have tended to require more exact
proof of the value of tangible than of intangible property.5 As the main issue
in the instant case was the sufficiency of petitioners' proof of substantial value
in excess of the cash and buildings, in order to include the property in invested
capital to the extent purchased by stock, a proper consideration of the case
should first attempt a determination of whether the expired contract rights
are tangible or intangible. The majority and dissenting opinions failed to
discuss this problem but seem to be based on opposite solutions of it; for the
only cases on invested capital cited in the majority opinion involve intangible
property; 6 and the dissenting opinion, although it cites no cases on invested
capital,7 quotes as applicable to the property a clause in the Revenue Act which
by its terms applies only to tangible property.S
The courts in seeking one outstanding characteristic common to all the
intangibles enumerated in the Revenue Act have evolved three different tests
of intangibility. One of these tests, suggested in a decision recently reversed
by the Circuit Court of Appeals, that property is intangible if given special
statutory protection,9 is inaccurate because good will does not receive such
protection, whereas bonds and notes do. Another, that property is intangible
if physically untouchable or inseparable,' 0 is the old common law distinction
and is at variance with the classification in the Revenue Act; 11 for a note or
an account receivable is no more touchable and separable than a patent on a
trademark. The third, that property is intangible if its value is unusually
difficult of determination,1 2 seems to express the intent of the Act 13 and to
4. Discussion is usually addressed to the general problem of requisite ac-
curacy of proof. See cases infra, note 6.
5. Compare the language in Rookwood Pottery Co. v. Commissioner, 45 F.
(2d) 43, 45 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930) and Conrad & Co. v. Commissioner, 50 F.
(2d) 576, 579 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931) involving intangible property, with Burnet
v. Houston, 283 U. S. 223, 228 (1931) (deductible loss on sale of stock) and
George A. Hormel & Co. v. United States, 39 F. (2d) 726, 730 (Ct. Cl. 1930)
involving tangible property.
6. Gauley Mountain Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 23 F. (2d) 574 (C. C. A.
4th, 1928); Lincoln Chemical Co. v. Edwards, 289 Fed. 458 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923);
Rookwood Pottery Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 5; News Publishing Co. v.
Blair, 29 F. (2d) 955 (App. D. C. 1928); Conrad & Co. v. Commissioner, supra
note 5; L. S. Plant & Co. v. Commissioner, 46 F. (2d) 306 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931).
7. Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U. S. 282 (1929) (excessive
salaries included as expenses); Reinecke v. Spalding, 280 U. S. 227 (1930)
(contested disallowance of depletion); Burnet v. Houston, supra note 6 (de-
ductible loss on sale of stock).
8. 40 STAT. 1092, § 326 (a) (2) (1919).
9. H. D. & J. K. Crosswell, Inc. v. Jones, 52 F. (2d) 880 (B. D. S. C. 1931),
r'ev'd, 60 F. (2d) 827 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932). The lower court used this test to
hold an exclusive sales agency contract tangible. The reversal seems proper.
McCoy-Brandt Machinery Co. v. Commissioner, 8 B. T. A. 909 (1927).
10. Daily Pantagraph, Inc. v. United States, 37 F. (2d) 783 (Ct. Cl. 1929).
11. Reserve Natural Gas Co. of Louisiana v. Commissioner, 15 B. T. A. 951
(1929). As pointed out in Jones v. Hi. D. & J. K. Crosswell, supra note 9, at
828, the enumerated tangibles were considered intangible at common law.
12. Strong Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 56 F. (2d) 550 (C. C. A. 7th,
1932).
13. H. D. and J. K. Crosswell, Inc. v. Jones, supra note 9, at 884.
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provide a useful criterion of distinction. It should be noted, however, that
the Act, more flexible than this test, sanctions the inclusion in intangible
property of anything which is like the enumerated classes regardless of its
conformity to any given test.' 4
The expired contract rights in the instant case are intangible within the
Revenue Act distinction both under the third test and because they are like
good will in that they are based on the reasonable expectation of profit from
a continuing though legally unenforceable physical relationship. Proof of
substantial value was therefore properly held sufficient. 15  The only close
analogy, a case in which a petitioner was allowed to include in invested capital
the value of the use of a spur track built to his mine under a contract which
had expired,' 6 is of little help since the court expressly refused to decide
whether the property was tangible or intangible.17 Here again, however, the
court did implicitly decide the question; it treated the property as tangible
inasmuch as it allowed the claim under a provision in the Revenue Act which
as construed by the courts permits only tangible property to be included in
invested capital as paid in or earned surplus.'8 But in view of the speculative
nature of any estimate of the value of the property and of its similarity to good
will it would seem to be intangible.
The Revenue Act provides that a limited amount of intangible property can
be included in invested capital when bona fdo paid in for stock or shares.1 0
The various interpretations of this provision indicate that intangible property
paid for in a medium of less certain value than stock or shares, such as
income bonds of contingent value at time of, issue even though later paid
in full, cannot be included in invested capital. -o Nor can intangible property
acquired gratuitously 2 l or the appreciation of intangible property without
cost to the owner 22 be so included. On the other hand intangible property bought
with cash, since it is a medium of more certain value than stock or shares,
can be included in invested capital 23 and may not be subject to the usual
limitations on the amount of intangible property allowed.24 The same reason-
14. The Act includes both the enumerated kinds of property and "other
like property," 40 STAT. 1091 (1919).
15. See note 6, supra.
16. Gauley Mountain Coal Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 6; see Colony
Coal and Coke Corp. v. Commissioner, and Hazard Coal Corp. v. Same, 52 F.
(2d) 923 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931) (similar cases).
17. Gauley Mountain Coal Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 6, at 577.
18. 40 STAT. 1092, § 326 (a) (3) (1919). Lewis A. Crossett Co. v. United
States, 50 F. (2d) 292 (Ct. Cl. 1931); Concrete Engineering Co. v. Commissioner,
58 F. (2d) 566 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932).
19. 40 STAT. 1092, § 326 (a) (4) & (5) (1919).
20.- Baker and Taylor Co. v. United States, 26 F. (2d) 187 (C. C. A. 2d,
1928).
21. Bacon Coal Co. v. United States, 34 F. (2d) 706 (E. D. N. Y. 1929);
Lafayette-South Side Bank v. Commissioner, 33 F. (2d) 646 (App. D. C. 1929).
22. Elrod Slug Casting Machine Co. v. Commissioner, 18 B. T. A. 1003
(1930); Loft, Inc. v. Bowers, 29 F. (2d) 654 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928); ef. La Belle
Iron Works v. United States, 256 U. S. 377 (1921) (law of tangibles).
23. Sapolin Co. Inc. v. Anderson, 54 F. (2d) 137 (S. D. N. Y. 1931);
Chicago Starch Co. v. Commissioner, 13 B. T. A. 1364 (1928).
24. Appeal of Cleveland Home Brewing Co., 1 B. T. A. 87 (1924); see United
States Envelope Co. v. Commissioner, 10 B. T. A. 84 (1928). For the limitations
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ing would seem to support the inclusion in invested capital of intangibles bought
with tangible property at its cash value. Where a mixed aggregate of tangible
and intangible property is paid in for stock, the stack is apportioned according
to their relative values, and the intangible property is allowed as invested
capital in that ratio.25  In general the property must have been purchased
as an asset rather than built up incidentally to the conduct of the business,
as for example, through sales promotion,26 unless petitioner can show that
the expense subsequently resulted in the acquisition of an asset.27 Thus a
newspaper's circulation obviously developed at least in part to promote sales
has been included in invested capital. 28 The rights in the instant case qualify
as invested capital under the limitations on method of acquisition as they
were purchased for cash and its equivalent in tangible property and for stock.
Petitioner could not reduce its income by depreciating these rights for if
treated as contract rights they cannot be depreciated since Article 203 of
Income Tax Regulations 74 provides that intangibles can be depreciated only
if on the basis of experience, their period of value is definitely limited; and
if they be treated as good will the same Article expressly forbids any de-
preciation.20 To disallow them as invested capital would thus deprive petitioner
of his only means of including them in his tax statement.
TRANSFER TAX ON TENANCY IN ENTIRETY CREATED BY WIFE
IN Pennsylvania a deed to husband and wife is presumed to create an estate
by the entirety where no different intention is disclosed.1  Married Women's
Property Acts have generally been held ineffective in any way to challenge the
continued existence of this type of joint tenancy peculiar to the relationship
of husband and wife. 2 Yet these same acts, since their purpose is to endow
on amount of intangible property allowed as invested capital see 40 STAT. 1092
(1919).
25. Appeal of St. Louis Screw Co., 2 B. T. A. 649 (1925); Tyler & Hippach,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 6 B. T. A. 636 (1927); D. N. & E. Walter & Co., Inc, v.
Commissioner, 10 B. T. A. 620 (1928).
26. Appeal of Providence Mill Supply Co., 2 B. T. A. 791 (1925); Appeal
of Carter Medicine Co., 3 B. T. A. 212 (1925).
27. Richmond Hosiery Mills v. Commissioner, 29 F. (2d) 262 (C. C. A. 5th,
1928); Three-in-One Oil Co. v. United States, 35 F. (2d) 987 (Ct. CI. 1929).
28. News Publishing Co. v. Blair, supra note 6; Strong Publishing Co. v.
Commissioner, supra note 12. In one case the court assumed that good will
apparently accumulated in the conduct of the business had become an asset,
L. S. Plaut & Co. v. Commissioner, supra note 6.
29. International Textbook Co. v. United States, 44 F. (2d) 254 (Ct. Cl.
1930); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Commissioner, 6 B. T. A. 1333 (1927); of.
Leggett and Platt Spring Bed Co. v. Crooks, 34 F. (2d) 492 (W. D. Mo. 1929);
Hyatt Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 43 F. (2d) 1008 (Ct. Cl. 1930)
(patent cases).
1. Merritt v. Whitlock, 200 Pa. 50, 49 Atl. 786 (1901). Massachusetts hag
changed this common law presumption by statute presuming a tenancy in common
unless it manifestly appear a joint tenancy is intended, MASS. GEN. LAWS
(Ter. Ed. 1932) c. 184, § 7; (1931) 11 B. U. L. REv. 396.
2. Bernatavicius v. Bernatavicius, 259 Mass. 486, 156 N. E. 685 (1927).
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the wife with a distinct legal capacity to deal with her property apart from
her husband, now make it possible for a husband to convey to himself and his
-wife an estate by the entirety without the necessity of deeding through a
trustee or third person.3 Such a result was formerly impossible under the
old common law rule that a wife could not be a grantee in a deed from her
husband.4 And by parity of reasoning as to this distinct legal capacity of
the -wife, she may join with her husband without the intervention of a trustee
in conveying to herself and her husband as tenants by the entirety.5
The power of spouses to create themselves tenants by the entirety of all
their real estate, and in some states of their personal property as well,0 might
be regarded as a matter of slight concern were it not for the possibility of
the abuse of this power to defeat the object of inheritance taxation of decedents'
estates. This problem is concisely demonstrated by a recent Pennsylvania case.7
A wife owning certain real estate since 1889, joined with her husband in
executing and delivering in 1928 a deed for said land to herself and her husband.
Upon her death, the survivorship interest accruing to her husband as tenant
by the entirety was held not taxable, by virtue of the Pennsylvania statute
expressly exempting such an interest from inheritance taxation.8
The legislative intent is clearly to favor the exemption of such interest in
the name of the marriage relationship, but there still remains the question
-whether such favor ought not to be withheld where the tenancy by the entirety
exists only by reason of the participation of the deceased in its creation. A
consideration of several cases in New Jersey, which alone seems heretofore to
have dealt with the specific problem, is illuminating. Although New Jersey
had decided, in accordance with the prevailing view in other states,9 that
under its general transfer inheritance tax1O there could be no tax levied on
a survivorship interest accruing at the death of any joint tenant,11 it never-
3. In re Klatz's Estate, 216 N. Y. 83, 110 N. E. 181 (1915); Boeringer v.
Schmid, 232 N. Y. Supp. 360 (1928); (1929) 9 B. U. L. REv. 134; (1929) 13
Mum. L. REv. 612. Under MASS. GEN. LAWS (Ter. Ed. 1932) c. 184, § 8 and c.
209, § 3, a conveyance by a husband to himself and his wife is held to create
an estate in joint tenancy and not a tenancy by the entirety. Ames v. Chandler,
265 Mass. 428, 164 N. E. 616 (1929).
4. Ames v. Chandler, supra note 3.
5. In re Vandergrift's Estate, 161 AtI. 898 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932).
6. In re Klenke's Estate, 210 Pa. 572, 60 Atl. 166 (1905); Ciconte v. Barba,
161 AUt. 925 (Del Ch. 1932) and cases cited therein at 92G. Contra: Blumenthal
-v. Grossman, 236 N. Y. 448, 141 N. E. 911 (1923).
7. In re Vandergrift's Estate, supra note 5.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 72, § 2301 (e). Oregon, too, has such
an express exception of tenancies by the entirety. 1 OnE. CODE (1930) 10-001.
Most states, on the other hand, provide for taxing the survivorship interest of
all types of joint tenancy without exception. MAss. GEN. LAWS (Ter. Ed. 1932)
c. 65, § 1; 2 N. J. ComP. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1925) § 208-537; H,%NmY, IN-
HERITANCE AND OTHER LIKE TAXES (1929) § 161.
9. Att'y Gen. v. Clark, 222 Mass. 291, 110 N. E. 299 (1915); In re McIntosh's
Estate, 289 Pa. 509, 137 AtI. 661 (1927).
10. P. L. (N. J.) 1909, c. 288.
11. HANDY, supra note 8, § 166: "The survivor does not take any interest
as heir or successor of the deceased, but solely by virtue of his own estate
originating at the time of the creation of the joint tenancies."
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theless held that where the deceased joint tenant was a participant in the
creation of the estate in joint tenancy, the survivorship interest might be taxed
as a transfer to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death,
vesting in the surviving joint tenant an absolute fee simple estate. 12 Although
New Jersey now expressly taxes all survivorship interests without exception,18
a recent dictum,14 regarding a transaction taking place before such enactment,
states that it might also be possible to tax a transfer to the wife comprised in
a conveyance to husband and wife as tenants by the entirety, if that con-
veyance had been made by the husband. In New Jersey, of course, there had
been no expression of the legislature such as there now is in Pennsylvania.
But it seems reasonable to argue, in the light of the conclusions reached by
the New Jersey courts that self-creation of tenancies by the entirety for the
sole purpose of avoiding taxation was not within the contemplation of the
Pennsylvania legislature in its exemption of such interests; and that the
transfer in the instant case might well be taxed under a concomitant provision
of the statute taxing transfers made to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or after death of the transferor. 15
EQUITY JURISDICTION OF SUIT By TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
TO RECOVER PREFERENCE
A TRUSTEE in bankruptcy filed a bill in equity to recover $1500 received from
the bankrupt as an alleged preferential payment of debts voidable under § 60b
of the Bankruptcy Act.1 The defendants, on the ground that the action was
triable at law before a jury and that equity had no jurisdiction, applied for
an order transferring the suit to the law side of the court. The application
was denied, and the trial proceeded in equity resulting in judgment for the
plaintiff.2 On writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment, declaring that in the absence
of a clear showing that the remedy at law was inadequate, a suit in equity
could not be maintained. 3
Upon the question of the jurisdiction of equity over actions involving
unlawful preferences, there is a wide diversity of opinion. A few courts have
taken the position that since proceedings in bankruptcy are in their nature
proceedings in equity,4 preferences, as creations of the Bankruptcy Act, must
12. In re Huggins' Estate, 96 N. J. Eq. 275 Atl. 27 (1924), aft'd, sub. Hor.
Fairleigh v. Bugbee, 130 Atl. 923 (1925), aff'd, 103 N. J. Law 182, 134 Atl. 917
(1926).
13. PUB. LAWS (N. J.) 1922, c. 174.
14. In re O'Neill, 111 N. J. Eq. 378, 381, 162 Atl. 425, 426 (1932).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. '72, § 2301 (a).
1. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 96 (b) (1926).
2. The decision of the District Court for the Southern District of New York
is unreported. Aff'd Irving Trust Co. v. Schoenthal, 54 F. (2d) 1079 (C. C. A.
2d, 1932).
3. Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 53 Sup. Ct. 50 (U. S. 1932).
4. See Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U. S. 524, 535 (1900); In ro Rochford,
124 Fed. 182, 187 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903); First National Bank v. Abbott, 105 Fed.
852, 855 (C. C. A. 8th, 1908); 3 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE JURISDICTION &
PROCEDURE (1931) § 1427.
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likewise be cognizable in equity.5 Others have concluded that because such
actions are essentially predicated upon constructive fraud, equity courts are
peculiarly adapted to deal with them.6 Preference suits have also been re-
garded as analogous to judgment creditors' actions to set aside fraudulent
conveyances.7 In such cases, it is reasoned, the transfer being originally valid,
is merely voidable at the election of the trustee in bankruptcy, who in order
to reach the preferential payments must have the transfer set aside in equity.8
The additional argument is often made that once the transfer is set aside, a
trust is impressed upon the assets in the possession of the preferred creditor
who holds them for the benefit of the general creditors of the bankrupt.O And
undeniably the tracing and administering of trust funds are appropriate sub-
jects of equity jurisdiction. On the other hand, in many cases no formal
rationalization of the problem is attempted, and courts have permitted prefer-
ence actions to be brought in equity apparently for the reason that equity
with its greater flexibility could more capably administer justice to fit the
particular case,10 or on the sole ground that in the interests of uniformity
it would be better to follow an established practice."1
The cases denying the jurisdiction of equity over suits to avoid preferences
seem in closer accord with orthodox principles. The mere fact that proceed-
ings in bankruptcy are equitable in nature, would seem insufficient to endow
equity with jurisdiction over preferences.' 2  Such suits can more properly be
regarded, not as proceedings in bankruptcy, but rather as ancillary proceedings
arising out of bankruptcy to be prosecuted in law or equity, depending, as in
other cases, on the nature of the relief sought.' 3 Consequently, if there is
some feature of the case peculiarly within the province of a court of equity,
such as the need for an accounting, or a discovery, or the reformation or can-
5. Reed v. Guaranty Security Corp., 291 Fed. 580 (D. Mass. 1923), aff'd
in part, 299 Fed. 265 (C. C. A. 1st, 1924).
6. In re Maher, 144 Fed. 503 (D. Blass. 1906); Johnson v. Hanley, Hoye
Co., 188 Fed. -752 (D. R. I. 1911); Gnichtel v. First National Bank, 66 N. J. Eq.
88, 53 Atl. 1041 (1902); see Eyre v. Potter, 56 U. S. 42, 56 (1853); Coder v.
Arts, 213 U. S. 223, 241 (1909).
7. Pond v. New York National Exchange Bank, 124 Fed. 992 (S. D. N. Y.
1903); Morris v. Neumann, 293 Fed. 974 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923); Dyer v. Kratzen-
stein, 103 App. Div. 404, 92 N. Y. Supp. 1012 (1st Dep't 1905); cf. 30 STAT.
557 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 75 (a) (2) (1926).
8. Pond v. New York National Exchange Bank; Dyer v. Kratzenstein, both
supra note 7.
9. Walker v. Wilkinson, 3 F. (2d) 867 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925), crt. den. 268
U. S. 701 (1925); Gnichtel v. First National Bank, supra note 6; Houghton v.
Stiner, 92 App. Div. 171, 87 N. Y. Supp. 10 (1st Dep't 1904); cf. Ratclifi v.
Clendenin, 232 Fed. 61 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916); Lytle v. Andrews, 34 F. (2d) 252
(C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
10. See Clements v. Moore, 73 U. S. 299, 312 (1869).
11. Parker v. Black, 151 Fed. 18 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907); Parker v. Sherman,
212 Fed. 917 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914); Cunningham v. Rennison, 8 A. B. R. (N. S.)
313 (D. Mass. 1926).
12. Adams v. Jones, 11 F. (2d) 759 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926), cert. den. 271 U. S.
685 (1926).
13. Westall v. Avery, 171 Fed. 626 (C. C. A. 4th, 1909); First State Bank v.
Spencer, 219 Fed. 503 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); Adams v. Jones, supra note 12;
CoLLrER, BANKRurY (Gilbert's 2d ed. 1931) § 60 I1 a.
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cellation of an instrument, or the avoidance of a multiplicity of suits, an equity
court could appropriately assume jurisdiction. However, where the trustee is
simply seeking the recovery and possession of specific real and personal prop-
erty, or the recovery of a money judgment, an action in the nature of trover,14
replevin,15 or for money had and received 16 would seem to afford him a com-
plete remedy. 17 Nor would the fact that preference actions are based upon
constructive fraud warrant a contrary result.1 8 For courts of law and equity
are generally recognized as having concurrent jurisdiction over fraud, and
where the action sounds in tort or assumpsit, there would seem to be no legal
basis for trying the case in equity and infringing the defendant's right to a
jury trial.19
Although the adequacy of the legal remedy and the defendant's right to a
jury trial are highly persuasive, it has been the established practice in the
First,20 Second,21 Fourth,22 and Seventh 23 Circuit Courts of Appeals to permit
actions to set aside preferential payments of money to be entertained on the
equity side of the court. A contrary result has been reached in the third,24
fifth,25 sixth,26 eighth,27 and ninth 28 circuits. The principal case is the first
instance in which the Supreme Court of the United States has indicated its
views upon the subject, in an apparent attempt to produce uniformity among
the circuits. While the decision is doctrinally sound, it may have the unfortu-
nate practical effect of further burdening congested jury dockets in busy
circuits, and delaying the administration of debtors' estates. It is possible,
however, that the holding in the instant case will not bring it about that all
such cases must be prosecuted at law. For the opinion of the court rests on
14. Burns v. O'Gorman Co., 150 Fed. 226 (C. C. R. I. 1906); Jackman v.
Eau Claire National Bank, 125 Wis. 465, 104 N. W. 98 (1905), aff'd, 204 U. S.
522 (1907); see Sessler v. Nemcof, 183 Fed. 656, 658 (E. D. Pa. 1910). In
England trover was usually resorted to for the recovery of preferential payments
by bankrupts. Meggot v. Mills, 1 Ld. Raym. 286 (Eng. 1697); Nixon v. Jenkins,
2 H. Bl. 135 (Eng. 1793).
15. - See Warmath v. O'Daniel, 159 Fed. 87, 90 (C. C. A. 6th, 1908).
16. Reber v. Ellis Bros., 185 Fed. 313 (E. D. Pa. 1911); People's Bank v.
M eAleer, 204 Ala. 101, 85 So. 413 (1920); Maxwell v. Davis Trust Co., 69
W. Va. 276, 71 S. E. 270 (1911); Marks v. Feldman, L. R. 5 Q. B. 276 (Eng.
1870).
17. Cf. Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146 (1891).
18. United States v. Bitter Root Development Co., 200 U. S. 451 (1906); see
Boonville National Bank v. Blakey, 166 Ind. 427, 443, 76 N. E. 529, 533 (1900).
19. Buzard v. Houston, 119 U. S. 347 (1886); Gray v. Beck, 6 Fed. 560
(D. N. J. 1881); Adams v. Jones, supra note 12.
20. Reed v. Guaranty Security Corp., supra note 5.
21. Parker v. Sherman, supra note 11.
22. Cox v. Wall, 99 Fed. 546 (W. D. N. C. 1900), aff'd, 101 Fed. 403 (C. C. A.
4th, 1900), rev'd on other grounds, 181 U. S. 244 (1901).
23. Off v. Hakes, 142 Fed. 364 (C. C. A. 7th, 1905).
24. Lewinson v. Hobart Service Trust Co., 49 F. (2d) 356 (D. N. J. 1931);
(1931) 31 CoL. L. REv. 1356.
25. Adams v. Jones, supra note 12.
26. Warmath v. O'Daniel, supra note 15.
27. First State Bank v. Spencer, supra note 13.
28. Gelinas v. Buffum, 52 F. (2d) 598 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931).
[Vol. 42
the application of § 267 of the Judicial Code 2 which has been vitiated by
dicta requiring the remedy at law, in order that it be exclusive of equity juris-
diction, to be "as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt
administration as the remedy in equity." 3 o Thus considerable leeway is still
available to district judges who may neutralize the effect of the decision by
finding in specific cases that the interests of "justice and its prompt adminis-
tration" require a trial in equity.
RELIE FROm DISPROPORTIONATE SENTENCE WITHIN MAXmIUm Lnm=Ts
PRESCRIBED BY CRIINAL STATUTE
IN criminal cases, the approximation of punishment to the degree of guilt of
the accused within the maximum and minimum penalties prescribed by statute
necessarily involves the use of discretion by the trial court. Where a penalty
within the statutory limits is clearly excessive, the availability of relief from
this apparent abuse of discretion becomes an important problem. In Widcne" v.
Harris,' the petitioner was indicted for removing distilled spirits on which
the tax had not been paid and for concealment after removal.2 Subsequent
to a plea of guilty on both counts, a sentence of five years' imprisonment was
imposed. After entering upon service of the sentence, she filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that she had been misled into entering the
plea of guilty, and that the judge, in sentencing her, had taken into consider-
ation a previous criminal charge of which she had been acquitted. The court
affirmed the order of the district court denying the discharge, on the ground
that since the committing court had the power and authority to act, the
soundness of its conclusions was not open to review in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings.
The petitioner in the instant case has already served part of her sentence,
and the time for direct appeal apparently has elapsed. Discharge on habeas
corpus having been denied, the only other means of relief now available is the
remote possibility of executive pardon.3 Although within the statutory maxi-
mum,4 the punishment inflicted by the trial court appears unusually severe.
Nevertheless it is difficult to perceive how the court could have granted relief
in the principal case without doing technical violence to the established doctrine
that only lack of jurisdiction in the committing court will secure a discharge
in habeas corpus proceedings.5
29. 36 STAT. 1163 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 384 (1926). "Suits in equity shall
not be sustained in any court . . . where a plain, adequate, and complete
remedy may be had at law."
30. See Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, 28 U. S. 210, 215 (1830); Kilbourn v.
Sunderland, 130 U. S. 505, 514 (1889).
1. 60 F. (2d) 956 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
2. Imprisonment for not less than three months nor more than three years
is authorized for each charge. 19 STAT. 393 (1877); 28 STAT. 566 (1894), 26
U. S. C. § 404 (1926).
3. Widener v. Harris, supra note 1, at 957.
4. See note 2, supra.
5. See 1 BA=tnY, HABEAs CoRPus (1913) §§ 30, 71. A writ of prohibition to
stay execution of the sentence would be denied for the same reason. 2 BAxry,
op. cit. supra § 356.
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A direct appeal by the accused in the original proceedings on the grounds that
the sentence was disproportionately severe would have been of no avail, since
the federal criminal procedure makes no provision for appellate review for
the purpose of modifying a sentence within the statutory limits, despite the
injustice of the result. In several early decisions, the old Circuit Court, under
statutory authority,6 reduced the sentences imposed by the trial court where
the degree of guilt clearly warranted lighter penalties7 No such statutory
power, however, has been given to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and the
principle has been definitely asserted that the nature of the sentence rests in
the discretion of the trial court and cannot be attacked in any case where
the punishment assessed is within the limits provided by law.8 The objection
to appellate review rests in the argument that the trial court is better qualified
to measure the merited punishment and that a sentence prescribed by statute,
although seemingly unfair, cannot be classified as an error of law capable of
supporting an appeal. Under this reasoning, a sentence will be modified only
when it is unauthorized by law, and then it will be corrected only to conform
with the statutory requirements.0
In some jurisdictions, however, sentences have been reduced on appeal, in
the absence of express statutory power, where the punishment, although per-
mitted by statute, was regarded as too severe.10 The reasoning in these cases
proceeds on the theory that an abuse of discretion by the trial court in
judging the amount of punishment necessary to vindicate the law is an error
of law reviewable on appeal. In view of the desirability of the result reached
in this manner, there seems to be sufficient justification, without the necessity
of express legislative power, for the modification of a sentence because of
contrariety of opinion regarding its fairness. The federal decisions reflect
adherence to the historical attitude of a narrow limitation of criminal appeals.
In order to obviate these historical difficulties, statutes have been enacted in
many states giving an appellate court the power to reduce or modify the sentence
of a lower court where, in view of the circumstances of the case, the punishment
6. "And in case of an affirmance of the district court, the circuit court shall
proceed to pronounce final sentence and to award execution thereon." 20 STAT.
354 (1879). In construing this statute, the court, in Bates v. United States,
10 Fed. 92, 96 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1881), said: "I think one object of the statute
was to give the circuit court authority . . . over the degree of punishment
imposed upon the party, if, upon the whole record before the circuit court, it
should appear in the judgment of the court that the penalty . . . was too
lenient or too severe."
7. Bates v. United States, supra note 6; United States v. Wynn, 11 Fed. 57
(C. C. E. D. Mo. 1882).
8. Wallace v. United States, 243 Fed. 300 (C. C. A. 7th, 1917), cart. den.,
245 U. S. 650 (1917); Freeman v. United States, 243 Fed. 353 (C. C. A. 9th,
1917), cert. den., 249 U. S. 600 (1919); Peterson v. United States, 246 Fed. 118
(C. C. A. 4th, 1917), cert. den., 246 U. S. 661 (1918).
9. Salazar v. United States, 236 Fed. 541 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916). Where the
sentence exceeds the maximum penalty, the prisoner can secure discharge on
habeas corpus after the legal part of the sentence has been served. Collins v.
Morgan, 243 Fed. 495 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917).
10. Walker v. State, 91 Ark. 497, 121 S. W. 925 (1909); Davis v. State, 155
Ark. 245, 244 S. W. 750 (1922),
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is too severe.1 1 An arbitrary imposition of a harsh sentence by the trial court
is thereby made subject to review by the upper court, and manifest miscarriages
of justice have often been avoided.12 The objection that such statutory powers
will induce unwarranted litigation and delay the processes of criminal prosecu-
tion is unsubstantial, since appellate courts probably reverse in many cases on
mere technicalities in the absence of power to modify outrageous sentences.
Moreover, the danger that habitual criminals clearly deserving of heavy
penalties will attempt to make use of this power as a device for delaying the
administration of justice is a negligible factor, since the appellate power thereby
conferred has been exercised only with the greatest caution.13
It is doubtful whether the claim that the accused was misled into entering
the plea of guilty could have secured relief on appeal even in the original
proceedings. The principle that a plea of guilty should be entered voluntarily
by one competent to know the consequences,' 4 and should not be induced by fear,
misapprehension, inadvertance or ignorance,'3 is modified by the rule that a
plea of guilty cannot, as a matter of right, be withdrawn merely because the
defendant was led by counsel or others to believe that he would receive a milder
punishment than if he stood trial,16 unless it is proved that the defendant was
misled by the judge or someone under authority of the court.17 The difficulty
of proof of the allegation that the judge, in sentencing her, had considered a
charge of crime of which she had been acquitted 's would leave petitioner with
little possibility for relief.
A court may thus sustain an unjust sentence in reliance upon the very
provisions of criminal statutes which exist to insure correspondence of pena:tie
11. For example, IDAHO C0au'. STAT. (1919) § 90S6; IOWA CODE (1931) §
14010; MONT. REv. CoD (Choate 1921) § 12127; NEB. COmP. STAT. (1929) §
29-2308; N. D. Comp. LAWS ANN. (1913) § 11015. In Barney v. State, 46 Neb.
515, 68 N. W. 636 (1896), it was objected that a reduction of the sentence
amounted to commutation and encroached upon the executive pardoning power.
But in Palmer v. State, 70 Neb. 136, 139, 97 N. W. 235, 236 (1903), the validity
of the statute was definitely settled in the affirmative. See also Fritz v. State,
8 Okla. Grim. Rep. 342, 128 Pac. 170 (1912); State v. Orlander, 193 Iowa 1379,
186 N. W. 53 (1922).
12. See State v. Hayden, 45 Iowa 11 (1876); Palmer v. State, supra note 11;
Hall v. State, 7 Okla. Crim. 126, 122 Pac. 729 (1912).
13. See State v. Freeman, 27 Iowa 333, 337 (1869).
14. State v. Ferranto, 112 Ohio St. 667, 148 N. E. 362 (1925); Polk v. State,
26 Oka. Crim. 283, 224 Pac. 194 (1924).
15. Clay v. State, 82 Fla. 83, 89 So. 353 (1921).
16. People v. Manriquez, 188 Cal. 602, 206 Pac. 63 (1922).
17. Foster v. State, 22 Ga. App. 109, 95 S. E. 529 (1918); Smith v. State,
27 Ga. App. 270, 108 S. E. 121 (1921).
18. In Peterson v. United States, su'pra note 8, accused was sentenced to three
years' imprisonment for stealing a $.40 money order stamp. On the trial,
testimony was introduced to show that he was also guilty of subornation of
perjury, an offense for which he had not been indicted. On the claim that he
was convicted of one crime and punished mainly for another, the appellate court
said: "Granted that a much milder sentence would be adequate for the mere
theft of this 40-cent stamp, it does not follow, and the letter does not show,
that any part of the punishment was imposed for the subornation of perjury,
or for the fraudulent use of the stamp which Peterson intended. . . ."
YALE LAW JOURNAL
with variations of guilt. Such a situation might be remedied were the appellate
courts vested with the power to modify a disproportionate sentence resulting
from an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Inasmuch as the federal courts
have refused to reduce sentences in the absence of statutory authority, a
legislative enactment conferring such power is desirable.
FEDERAL INJUNCTION OF STATE SUIT BY CREDITOR UPON BOND OF
PURCHASER AT RECEIVER'S SALE
A FEDERAL equity receiver appointed by the District Court for Massachusetts
turned over the assets of the receivership estate to a purchaser who
agreed to pay the creditors thirty percent of their claims and the receiver's
liabilities and expenses, within thirty days of proof and allowance by the
court. A bond in the penal sum of $100,000, signed by the purchaser as
principal and two others as sureties and running to the United States, was
filed, conditioned on compliance with the foregoing agreement. Upon non-
payment of his claim within the stipulated time, X, one of the creditors, brought
suit on the bond in a Massachusetts court,1 obtaining therein attachments
upon property of the sureties and injunctions against transfer of certain prop-
erty. While this action was pending, the receiver filed an ancillary bill of
complaint on the bond in the federal court and obtained judgment for a sum
sufficient to satisfy the claims of all creditors including X. Nothing was
obtained on execution, however, and upon citation for contempt the sureties
were ordered to make payments of $1000 monthly until the judgment was
satisfied. The receiver then moved to have X enjoined from prosecuting the
state suit, except to reduce his claim to judgment. On appeal the Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the order allowing the motion.2
If, in this race amongst creditors for the assets of the obligors on the bond,
X obtains judgment in the state suit and execution thereon, lie has assets of
theirs under court custody sufficient to satisfy his thirty percent claim inimedi-
ately and in full. This amounts to a preference in his favor at the expense of
the receiver and other creditors who, at best, can hope for only a pro rata share
of $1000 per month; and, even then, only if satisfaction of X's claim does not
so exhaust the property of the sureties as to render them incapable of making
these monthly payments. On the other hand, if X is restrained from execution
on the state judgment, the sureties' property in the Massachusetts court is
released and a source provided from which the claims of all creditors may be
treated equally.
The varying interests of X and the other creditors are dependent upon the
respective powers of the state and federal courts. Congressional enactment
expressly denies to federal courts of equity the right to issue injunctions against
state proceedings where both have concurrent jurisdiction over the parties and
subject matter.3 Judicial construction of exceptions to this sweeping prohibition
1. X sought and obtained leave from the District Court to commence the
state action. Both majority and dissent treat this leave as a useless superfluity,
creating no right where none otherwise exists.
2. Raphael v. Monroe, 60 F. (2d) 16 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932) (one judge dis-
senting).
3. 1 STAT. 334 (1793); 28 U. S. C. § 379 (1926); JuD. CODE § 265. An express
exception is made in favor of injunctions authorized by any law relating to
proceedings in bankruptcy.
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has been scrupulously limited to a few well recognized instances.4 Where the
federal court has custody of specific property in an action in rom, it Will enjoin
any state suit in regard thereto, since it is impossible that two courts exercise
jurisdiction over the same res without undesirable conflict.5  Again, where
federal jurisdiction once exercised is in some other way defeated or impaired by
state suit,' the federal court will act by way of injunction to protect its juris-
diction, judgments, or decrees.6
The bond was not a substitute for the assets of the receivership estate
enabling the federal court to exercise exclusive jurisdiction thereover on the
ground of prior custody of the yes.7 Nor did the state suit in any way operate
to defeat or impair federal jurisdiction previously acquired. Since the bond
guaranteed payment to the individual creditors, "there were no matters left
over requiring judicial action of that court in relation to the receivership
property or to any rights litigated in the receivership proceedings making
necessary any further orders or decrees to establish the rights of the parties
therein, which were or could be interfered with by the suit in the state court." 8
The court is patently advising the receiver in the future to have payment
of the purchase price, and the accompanying guaranty in the bond, made to
himself as an officer of the court. He alone, then, as a correlative of his duty
to distribute the money so paid in, would have the right to sue on the bond,
thus forestalling amongst creditors any attempt to initiate a race for the assets
of the principal and sureties, whose personal obligations on the bond have
superseded the rights of the creditors to the assets of the receivership debtor.
Or secondly, a tie-up of the sureties' assets in the state court beyond federal
control might have been avoided, and yet the advantages of separate suit by
the individual creditors on a bond large enough on its face to satisfy all their
claims retained, by requiring the same sort of bond as the one here in question,
but with an express decree of the receivership court that all suits in reference
thereto should be brought in the federal court.0 Should a single creditor bring
such suit in the proper forum, it is doubtful whether the court would be willing
to permit satisfaction in full of his judgment against the assets of the obligors
on the bond where it in fact appears that to do so would exhaust such assets
or create a preference in his favor at the expense of those less diligent in
prosecuting to judgment their claims under the bond. It is more likely that in
such a ease, the federal court, having expressly retained jurisdiction of suits
on the bond for the purpose of itself settling and determining all questions
arising out of the original receivership proceedings,lO would allot a pro rata
4. Charles Warren, Federal and State Court Interference (1930) 43 HArv.
L. REv. 345.
5. Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922); (1923) 36 HAnv.
L. REv. 461.
6. Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U. S. 93 (1904); Hull v. Burr, 234 U. S.
712, 723 (1913); (1923) 36 HARv. L. REv. 461.
7. A contention that it was, made by the receiver, was not seriously con-
sidered by either the majority or dissent.
8. Raphael v. Monroe, supra note 2, at 19; ef. Hanlon v. Smith, 175 Fed. 192
(1909); 1 CLARK, LAW OF RECErs (1918) § 874.
9. Julian v. Central Trust Co, supra note 6; cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v.
Broadway and Seventh Avenue Ry. Co., 43 F. (2d) 130 (S. D. N. Y. 1930).
But cf. In re Putnam, 55 F. (2d) 73, 74 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
10. Cf. Julian v. Central Trust Co.; Guaranty Trust Co. v. Broadway and
Seventh Avenue Ry Co., both supra note 9.
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share of the assets within the court's control to those creditors named in the
bond who, within a time stipulated by the court, will have reduced their claims
to judgment.
In view of the ease with which the sort of situation presented in the instant
case may be obviated, it seems unwise to force the issue, as the dissenting judge
does, of federal supremacy in all matters arising out of a federal equity receiver-
ship.
